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INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL OR PARTICULARLY WELL 
SUITED?  RECONSIDERING THE TREATMENT OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN USE VARIANCE APPLICATIONS 
Megan E. Bedell ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The placement of affordable housing in New Jersey has prompt-
ed a contentious and enduring debate.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has penned hundreds of pages in an attempt to orchestrate a 
workable resolution.
1
  In the landmark case, Southern Burlington Coun-
ty NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I),
2
 the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court denounced the common practice of exclusionary 
zoning and later reaffirmed its denunciation in Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II).
3
  The ef-
fort on the part of the New Jersey Supreme Court to confront exclu-
sionary zoning practices has been referred to as “among the most 
ambitious judicial crusades” in the country.
4
  At the time of Mount 
Laurel I, municipalities commonly used their zoning ordinances as a 
tool to exclude low-income residents from their borders
5
 in an at-
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thoughtful remarks and moral support.  To my parents, Thomas and Dore Bedell, 
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 1 See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975); S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 2 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 3 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 4 John Charles Boger, Lessons Learned from Mount Laurel: Mount Laurel at 21 Years: 
Reflections on the Powers of Courts and Legislatures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1450, 1452 (1997). 
 5 See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 718–19. 
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tempt to keep property taxes down.
6
  In the face of these practices, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that every municipality has a 
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing.
7
  After eight 
years of municipalities resisting Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court reaffirmed municipalities’ constitutional obligation to 
provide affordable housing, expanded the builder’s remedy, a device 
intended to encourage municipalities to comply with Mount Laurel I,
8
 
and invited the New Jersey State Legislature to become involved in 
the fight to end exclusionary zoning practices.
9
  The New Jersey Leg-
islature passed the Fair Housing Act of 1985 (FHA) in an attempt to 
give life to the constitutional mandate that the Supreme Court an-
nounced in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II.
10
  The FHA created a 
comprehensive system by which municipalities could participate in a 
program that would assign their fair share of the housing shortfall 
and in return provide participating municipalities protection from 
builder’s remedy lawsuits.
11
 
Prior to implementation of a comprehensive legislative scheme 
to handle the deficiency of affordable housing, New Jersey’s courts 
deemed affordable housing an inherently beneficial use for the pur-
poses of obtaining a use variance under the Municipal Land Use Law 
(MLUL).
12
  The effect of decreeing affordable housing an inherently 
beneficial use was to relax certain requirements in the use variance 
 
 6  Id. at 723.    
 7 See id. at 724. 
 8 A builder’s remedy is a device intended to encourage municipalities to comply 
with Mount Laurel I that allows a developer who has successfully challenged a munici-
pality’s exclusionary zoning ordinances to construct its development where it pro-
posed to do so, unless the municipality can come forward with environmental or 
other substantial planning concerns.  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 456 A.2d at 452. 
 9  See id. at 415. 
 10 N.J. STAT.  ANN. §§ 52:27D-302–03 (West 2008). 
 11 See discussion of a builder’s remedy infra Part II.C.  The FHA created the 
Council on Affordable Housing to oversee municipalities’ compliance with their 
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing.  See infra Part II.C.  Recently 
the New Jersey legislature has sought to significantly alter the legal framework in ex-
istence regarding the development of affordable housing.  See infra note 263.  For the 
purposes of arguments made within this Comment, it is inconsequential whether the 
oversight powers remain with the Council on Affordable Housing or are vested in 
another governmental agency.  See infra note 263 for further discussion on recent 
developments regarding bills to abolish the Council on Affordable Housing.     
 12 For purposes of this Comment, “use” variance will refer to any variance issued 
under § 40:55D-70(d)(1) of the Municipal Land Use Law.  See, e.g., Wash. Shopping 
Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash. Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
LEXIS 427, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2008) (“A variance issued pur-
suant to [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70(d)(1)] is generally known in land use law as a 
‘use’ variance.”); see also infra Part IV.A–B.  
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application process, thereby making it easier for an applicant to ob-
tain reprieve from zoning restrictions.
13
  Specifically, the supreme 
court found five years prior to deciding Mount Laurel I that “fur-
nish[ing] housing for minority or underprivileged segments of the 
population outside of ghetto areas is a special reason [for the pur-
poses of granting a use variance].”
14
  More than likely, the motivation 
behind granting affordable housing such coveted status was to help 
end exclusionary zoning practices.
15
 
Assessment of whether New Jersey’s attempt to end exclusionary 
zoning practices has been successful is mixed.  While the efforts ex-
pended under the FHA appear to have helped create more afforda-
ble housing, the housing that has been built appears to be priced at a 
rate affordable only to the wealthiest of low-income earners and has 
not helped relocate urban minorities to New Jersey suburbs.
16
  In 
terms of actual numbers, the Council on Affordable Housing states 
that it has given certification for 70,000 units, 36,000 of which have 
been built.
17
  Despite compliance by many municipalities with the 
FHA, a recent appellate division case has added fuel to the affordable 
housing fire. 
In August 2009, the appellate division announced its decision in 
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Township Land Use Planning Board 
(Homes of Hope).
18
  Homes of Hope involved a novel issue that touched 
upon the interplay between the statutory scheme created for han-
dling affordable housing, the FHA, and the statutory scheme which 
governs a municipality’s ability to zone and grant variances, the 
MLUL.
19
  The appellate division decided that a zoning board should 
 
 13 See Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427, at *7; see infra 
Part V.B. 
 14 DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 267 A.2d 31, 38 (N.J. 
1970). 
 15 See DeSimone, 267 A.2d at 34. 
Englewood, like many others, is a city of striking contrasts.  It is five 
square miles in area . . . . The population of about 28,000 is 20% to 
25% Black. . . . [I]ts white population is generally affluent  . . . .  By far 
the greater part of the black population lives in the Fourth Ward . . . 
and a very high percentage of the housing there is substandard, much 
of it not capable of rehabilitation. 
See id. 
 16 Boger, supra note 4, at 1454–55 (1997).  
 17 Reports & Quick Facts, N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/reports/ (last visited Jan. 7, 
2010) (on file with author).  
 18 976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 19 See infra Part IV.B.  
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consider an application for a use variance to build affordable housing 
in light of the preferential standard known as the inherently benefi-
cial use doctrine, even though the municipality has satisfied its consti-
tutional affordable housing obligation per the FHA.
20
  The decision 
inspired an array of criticism ranging from allegations that the case 
overruled relevant precedent to predictions that the case would lead 
to an onslaught of litigation.
21
  Most, if not all, of the criticism was ex-
aggerated and failed to mention the principled reasons for objecting 
to the appellate division’s decision in Homes of Hope.
22
 
The inherently beneficial use doctrine is a judicially created doc-
trine that recognizes some uses as so necessary to the general welfare 
that municipalities should view a use variance application for those 
uses favorably.
23
  As such, the inherently beneficial use doctrine allows 
for departure from the requirement that a use variance applicant 
show that the target piece of property is particularly well-suited for 
the desired use.
24
  But where a municipality has planned for and con-
structed affordable housing in full satisfaction of its constitutional ob-
ligation per the FHA, a demonstrated need no longer exists within 
that municipality for affordable housing as evidenced by that munici-
pality’s certification under the FHA.  Therefore, allowing affordable 
housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use in a municipality 
that has fully satisfied its FHA obligation is counterintuitive because 
there is no demonstrable need to warrant relaxing considerations of 
site suitability for the proposed use.  As a result, the appellate divi-
 
 20 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).  On October 8, 2010 the appellate divi-
sion invalidated significant portions of the revised third round rules promulgated by 
the Council of Affordable Housing.  See In re N.J.A.C 5:96 and 5:97, No. A-5382-07T3, 
2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct 8. 2010).  The court found 
the growth-share methodology allows a municipality to shirk its affordable housing 
requirements by passing land use ordinances that retard development.  Id. at *20.  
The court advised “COAH to adopt third round rules that incorporate a methodolo-
gy similar to the methodology set forth in the first and second rules, which were ap-
proved by courts in most respects.”  Id. at 29.  The court noted that it had doubts as 
to whether any growth share methodology would be valid under the Mount Laurel 
doctrine because the supreme court, in Mount Laurel II, indicated a disapproval of 
any methodology “that was substantially dependent upon individual municipalities’ 
decisions as to whether to grow.”  Id. at 29.   It is unclear from the opinion whether 
the substantive certification granted to municipalities, such as Eastampton, remains 
valid or not.  The court charged COAH with creating new rules within five months.  
Id. at 78.   
 21 See infra Part IV.C.  
 22 See infra Part IV.D. 
 23 WILLIAM COX, NEW JERSEY ZONING AND LAND USE ADMINISTRATION 187 (2010). 
 24 See infra Part III.B.  
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sion’s decision in Homes of Hope unnecessarily duplicates and under-
mines the FHA process and it also ignores the limited role use va-
riances should have in the development of municipalities. 
The inherently beneficial use doctrine should be reserved for 
uses for which a municipality and its surrounding areas have a need.
25
  
As such, if a municipality has satisfied its FHA obligation, a use va-
riance to build affordable housing should be reviewed under the 
non-inherently beneficial use standard, which requires the piece of 
property for which the variance is requested to be particularly well-
suited for the use.
26
  This is the appropriate course of action because 
a well-recognized preference exists within the state of New Jersey for 
land-use planning via zoning.
27
  And because of this preference, the 
grant of a use variance will always be considered the exception, rather 
than the rule.
28
  Therefore, each decision to grant or deny a use va-
riance should be reviewed on its own facts.
29
  Furthermore, zoning 
boards are recognized as particularly well-equipped to determine the 
efficacy of denying a variance, and therefore, decisions by zoning 
boards are reviewed in a deferential manner by the judiciary when 
they are challenged.
30
  These reasons necessitate the conclusion that a 
municipality that has actually achieved its allotment of affordable 
housing, as determined under the FHA, should be entitled to review 
an application for a use variance to build affordable housing under 
the non-inherently beneficial use analysis which requires the use be 
particularly well-suited for the piece of land in question.
31
 
To provide context for the debate in New Jersey over affordable 
housing, in Part II, this Comment will set out the framework in which 
the New Jersey Supreme Court established a municipality’s constitu-
tional obligation to provide affordable housing and the subsequent 
codification of that obligation by the New Jersey State Legislature in 
the FHA.  In Part III, this Comment will discuss the process by which 
a use variance is granted and provide examples of uses that are and 
are not considered inherently beneficial and the judiciary’s reasoning 
behind declaring certain uses inherently beneficial.  Part IV will dis-
 
 25 See infra Part III.C. 
 26 See infra Part III.B (discussing what an applicant must show to obtain a use va-
riance).  
 27 See COX, supra note 23, at 182. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990). 
 30 See infra Part III.A. 
 31 See infra Part III.B (discussing what an applicant must show to obtain a use va-
riance). 
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cuss the development of the inherently beneficial use doctrine by the 
judiciary, the application of the inherently beneficial use standard to 
affordable housing, the Homes of Hope decision, and whether the out-
cry over the Homes of Hope decision is warranted.  Finally, Part V will 
discuss why the Homes of Hope decision effectively allows the excep-
tion, a use variance, to swallow the rule, the preference for zoning, 
and why an application for affordable housing in a municipality that 
has achieved its fair share of affordable housing should be reviewed 
under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis. 
II. A MUNICIPALITY’S FAIR SHARE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING:  
A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND CRITICISMS 
A. Mount Laurel I 
In 1975 the New Jersey Supreme Court confronted exclusionary 
zoning practices head on in Mount Laurel I.
32
  The plaintiffs in Mount 
Laurel I were a group of minorities, Hispanics and blacks, who were 
seeking affordable housing in Mount Laurel.
33
  Mount Laurel, like 
many other municipalities, engaged in exclusionary land use zon-
ing.
34
  For instance, Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance retained 29.2% 
of land within the municipality for industry.
35
  But the court noted, 
“as happens in the case of so many municipalities, much more land 
[had] been so zoned than the reasonable potential for industrial 
movement or expansion warrant[ed].”
36
  Because the land was zoned 
for industry, residential dwellings were prohibited in that zone.
37
  The 
zoning ordinance designated 10,000 acres for residential develop-
ment and divided this land into four zones.
38
  Each zone only permit-
ted single-family detached dwellings, which allowed for substantial 
development but at a low density.
39
  The court found that the “ordin-
ance requirements, while not as restrictive as those in many similar 
municipalities, nonetheless realistically allow only homes within the 
financial reach of persons of at least middle income.”
40
  Mount Laurel 
effectively zoned out low- and moderate-income citizens by creating 
 
 32 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 33 Id. at 717. 
 34 See id. at 719.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  
 38 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 719.   
 39 Id.   
 40 Id.  
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large lot-size requirements, age restrictions, and limits or prohibitions 
on the number of children that could live within a particular zone.
41
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the tax structure 
of New Jersey motivated municipalities to use exclusionary zoning.
42
  
Specifically, the court found the objective of such zoning practices 
was to keep property taxes down
43
 because the cost of funding munic-
ipal county governments, and primary and secondary education is 
derived from taxes on local real estate.
44
  The fewer children in a mu-
nicipality’s schools, the lower the overall cost to run the schools, 
which would result in lower taxes in the community.
45
  Municipalities 
require large lot sizes to generate greater tax revenue to meet the 
cost of educating the school-age children in the community
46
 and 
adopt restrictions on the amount of bedrooms or completely ban 
multi-family dwellings to help reduce the actual number of children 
in the municipality.
47
  By doing so, municipalities disfavor low- and 
moderate-income families who cannot purchase mega-mansions that 
help fund the increased education costs.
48
  In light of the prevalent 
use of exclusionary zoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
“every [developing] municipality must . . . presumptively make realis-
tically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing.”
49
  The 
court found that a municipality could not foreclose the opportunity 
of affordable housing within its boundaries and that a municipality 
must provide for its “fair share of the present and prospective region-
al need”
50
 for such housing. 
B. Mount Laurel II and a Plea for Legislative Intervention 
Eight years later, in the face of continued exclusionary land use 
practices, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Mount Laurel II.
51
  
The court found that Mount Laurel persisted in its use of “a blatantly 
exclusionary [zoning] ordinance.”
52
  The court affirmed its commit-
 
 41 Id. at 721–22.  
 42 Id. at 723. 
 43 Id. 
 44 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 723. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
 48 See id. 
 49 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d. at 724. 
 50 Id.  
 51 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 52 Id. at 410. 
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ment to the constitutional obligation of municipalities to provide an 
opportunity for affordable housing that it previously announced in 
Mount Laurel I.
53
  It sought to clarify, to strengthen, and to make easi-
er public officials’ and municipalities’ abilities to conform to the con-
stitutional obligation.
54
  The court explained that the constitutional 
power to zone must be exercised for the general welfare and that the 
general welfare, in terms of housing, was not limited to just the mu-
nicipality’s needs but the general welfare of the surrounding region 
that creates a housing demand within a particular municipality.
55
  The 
court declared that when a developer successfully challenged exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances and proposed a housing project that con-
tained a certain percentage of affordable housing, a builder’s remedy 
should exist.
56
  A builder’s remedy essentially allows the developer’s 
project to be built in the proposed spot unless the municipality can 
come forth with evidence of environmental or other substantial 
planning concerns.
57
  In Mount Laurel II, the Supreme Court noted its 
preference for legislative action on the matter of affordable housing, 
but it also noted that it would continue to uphold the constitutional 
obligation established in Mount Laurel I.
58
 
C. The Legislature Responds: The Nuts and Bolts of the FHA 
Ten years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Mount 
Laurel I, the New Jersey State Legislature adopted the Fair Housing 
Act.
59
  The stated intention of the FHA is to implement a framework 
that allows for enforcement of a municipality’s constitutional obliga-
tion to provide affordable housing as stated in Mount Laurel I and af-
firmed in Mount Laurel II.
60
  Specifically, the legislature explained that 
“this act is in the public interest in that it comprehends a low and 
moderate income housing planning and financing mechanism in ac-
cordance with regional considerations and sound planning concepts 
which satisfies the constitutional obligation enunciated by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.”
61
  The FHA established the Council on Af-
fordable Housing (Council or COAH), which has primary jurisdic-
 
 53 Id. at 415. 
 54 Id. at 410. 
 55 Id. at 415.   
 56 Id. at 452. 
 57 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 456 A.2d at 452. 
 58 Id. at 417.  
 59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 2001). 
 60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-303 (West 2009). 
 61 Id.  
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tion over the administration of housing obligations.
62
  The Council is 
charged with determining housing regions, estimating the regional 
need for low- and moderate- income housing, and adopting criteria 
for determining each municipality’s current and prospective share of 
that need based on a ten year period.
63
  Participation in the statutory 
scheme implemented by the legislature to tackle the affordable hous-
ing problem within the state is not mandatory.
64
  If a municipality 
chooses to participate, it does so by adopting a resolution of partici-
pation and informing the Council of its intent to submit a housing 
plan.
65
  No punishment is imposed for failure to participate, but a 
municipality that chooses not to participate does not get the benefit 
of exhausting administrative remedies provided by the statute prior 
to litigation.
66
  Recently, the Council announced its highest level of 
participation in the Third Round with 303
67
 of the 566
68
 municipali-
ties in New Jersey signaling their intent to participate. 
Under the FHA, a participating municipality must create a hous-
ing element that will meet its current and prospective need for af-
fordable housing.
69
  The housing element should include an invento-
ry of existing housing stock that details the number of affordable 
housing units available, the rental value, a projection of future af-
fordable housing construction, analysis of the municipality’s demo-
graphic characteristics, and its existing and probable future employ-
ment opportunities.
70
  The FHA provides a non-exhaustive list as to 
how a municipality can comply with its affordable-housing require-
ments.
71
  The suggestions include a redetermination of how much 
land is needed for residential housing, a determination of how to 
 
 62 Id. § 52:27D-304(a).  
 63 Id. § 52:27D-307. 
 64 See id. § 52:27D-309(a) (stating that “each municipality which so elects shall, by 
duly adopted resolution of participation, notify the council of its intent to submit to 
the council its fair share housing plan” (emphasis added)); see also COAH Fact Sheet, 
N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 
http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/reports/factsheet.html (last visited Feb. 
7, 2009) (stating “[t]he Act [FHA] also stipulated that . . . COAH is a voluntary 
process”) [hereinafter COAH Fact Sheet]. 
 65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309(a).  
 66 See § 52:27D-309(b). 
 67 Press Release, Council on Affordable Housing, Council on Affordable Housing 
Announces Record Participation (Jan. 7, 2009). 
 68 Fast Facts, STATE OF N.J., http://www.state.nj.us/nj/about/facts/facts (last vi-
sited March 29, 2009). 
 69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-310; see supra note 11. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. § 52:27D-311. 
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keep housing units affordable to low- and moderate-income resi-
dents, and plans for infrastructure expansion if required.
72
  A muni-
cipality then submits its newly created housing element to the Coun-
cil and petitions the Council for substantive certification.
73
  If the 
public makes no objections to a municipality’s housing element with-
in forty-five days after the date of notice to the public, the Council 
will review the housing element and grant substantive certification 
providing certain criteria are met.
74
 
Upon receiving substantive certification and construction of the 
affordable-housing units the municipality is obligated to build, a mu-
nicipality may alter its zoning ordinances without approval of the 
Council.
75
  Thus, a municipality may rezone property zoned for af-
fordable housing if it has received substantive certification and built 
the required housing to fulfill its obligation.
76
  This is significant be-
cause the law designed to handle construction of affordable housing, 
the FHA, allows a municipality to eliminate planned surplus, but af-
fordable housing remains an inherently beneficial use for the pur-
poses of obtaining a use variance.  This makes the use variance pro-
cedure, which is regarded as an exception to the preference for 
zoning, more protective than the FHA when it comes to surplus af-
fordable housing.  In order to achieve efficient land uses and to har-
monize the FHA with the MLUL, the prospect of excess affordable 
housing should be treated the same under both statutes.  Doing this 
is particularly salient given the intended rarity of variances.
77
  Treat-
ing affordable housing as a non-inherently beneficial use would allow 
affordable housing to be treated similarly under both the FHA and 
 
 72 § 52:27D-311(a)(2),(3),(4). 
 73 Id. § 52:27D-313. 
 74 Substantive certification will be granted provided the Council finds: 
[a] The municipality’s fair share plan is consistent with the rules and 
criteria adopted by the council and not inconsistent with achievement 
of the low and moderate income housing needs of the region . . . [b] 
The combination of the elimination of unnecessary housing cost-
generating features from the municipal land use ordinances and regu-
lations, and the affirmative measures in the housing element and im-
plementation plan make the achievement of the municipality’s fair 
share of low and moderate income housing realistically possible . . . .  
Id. § 52:27D-314.  
 75 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(g). 
 76 See id.; see also V & L Assocs. v. Twp. of Montville, No. A-2121-04T5, 2006 N.J. 
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1343, at *41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jun. 2, 2006) (interpret-
ing § 52-27D-311(g) and stating that “[t]he only benefit conferred by the statute [§ 
52:27D-311(g)] is to allow a municipality to rezone property that had been designat-
ed for affordable housing but later determined to be surplus to its obligations”). 
 77 See infra Part III.A. 
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the MLUL; yet, a non-inherently beneficial use analysis would still al-
low for construction of additional affordable housing after taking in-
to account the pertinent criteria. 
Notably, the FHA effectively eliminated the builder’s remedy for 
municipalities that receive substantive certification.
78
  But municipali-
ties that choose not to participate in the Council’s certification 
process are susceptible to builder’s remedy lawsuits and “lose their 
ability to choose where and how affordable housing will be pro-
vided.”
79
  In Homes of Hope, the Eastampton Land Use Planning Board 
(Board) argued that declaring affordable housing an inherently 
beneficial use in a municipality that has received substantive certifica-
tion from the Council would be tantamount to a builder’s remedy.
80
  
The Board reasoned that the effect was similar because it would lose 
the ability to control the location of affordable housing within its 
boundaries despite its compliance with the Council’s requirements.
81
 
Homes of Hope, Inc. disagreed; it pointed to the definition of a 
builder’s remedy as found in the FHA.
82
  Specifically, Homes of Hope, 
Inc. explained the relief it sought was prerogative writ relief
83
 and not 
a builder’s remedy that would be a “court imposed remedy for a liti-
gant who is an individual or a profit-making entity in which the court 
requires a municipality to utilize zoning techniques . . . which provide 
the economic viability of a residential development.”
84
 
Clearly, Homes of Hope, Inc. did not literally seek a builder’s 
remedy, but the practical effect of allowing affordable housing to re-
main as an inherently beneficial use in Eastampton is the same as a 
builder’s remedy.  Eastampton did in fact lose its ability to decide 
where affordable housing would go within its borders despite having 
planned accordingly for its fair share of the housing shortfall, having 
received substantive certification of its plan and effecting construc-
tion of its fair share creating a surplus of at least twenty-one units.
85
  
 
 78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-328. 
 79 COAH Fact Sheet, supra note 64.  
 80 Brief of Defendant/Appellant Eastampton Township Land Use Planning 
Board at 14–15, Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 
976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 9, 2008) (No. A-5551-07T2) [hereinaf-
ter Brief of Eastampton]. 
 81 See id. at 11.  
 82 Brief of Plaintiff/Respondent Homes of Hope, Inc. at 16, Homes of Hope, Inc. 
v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Oct. 2, 2008) (No. A-5551-07T2) [hereinafter Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc.]. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at 10.  
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This is an important point because in a FHA compliant municipality, 
a use variance for affordable housing will effectively be a builder’s 
remedy despite the legislature’s attempt to do away with builders’ 
remedies in the FHA.  Per the decision in Homes of Hope, an applica-
tion for a use variance to build affordable housing will be analyzed 
under the inherently beneficial use status, which does not take into 
account site suitability.
86
  Effectively, a municipality loses control over 
where affordable housing goes, just as it does via a builder’s remedy, 
despite its compliance with the FHA and despite a lack of need for 
affordable housing as evidenced by its compliance with the FHA.  If 
an application to build affordable housing is reviewed under the non-
inherently beneficial use standard, a municipality would retain more 
control over where affordable housing is built within its borders. 
D. The Successes and Failures of the FHA 
The FHA has been criticized as a deviation from what the New 
Jersey Supreme Court intended in Mount Laurel I and II.  While the 
objective behind implementing the FHA was to codify the constitu-
tional obligation announced in Mount Laurel I and affirmed in Mount 
Laurel II, some argue that the FHA weakened the obligation with un-
necessary procedure.
87
  Others conclude that while benefits have 
been associated with the FHA, those benefits have not been bestowed 
upon racial minorities.
88
  One author found that while some afforda-
ble housing may have been produced by the FHA, “those units have 
primarily gone to white home buyers, furthering the racial segrega-
tion and contradicting the spirit of Mount Laurel.”
89
 
A study conducted in 1997 indicated that black and Latino ap-
plicants had significantly less success in obtaining affordable housing 
than their white counterparts.
90
  At the time the study was done, the 
authors concluded that, in obtaining affordable housing, blacks had 
only half of the success rate of whites and that Latinos had a third of 
 
 86 See infra Part III.B. 
 87 See Eamonn K. Bakewell, Foreclosure of a Dream: The Impact of the Council on Af-
fordable Housing’s New Regulations on the Constitutional Duty to Provide Affordable Housing 
in New Jersey, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 317–20 (2005). 
 88 Bernard K. Ham, Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Radical Segregation: A Re-
consideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 609–10 
(1997). 
 89 Id. at 610. 
 90 Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, Mount Laurel Housing Symposium: The 
Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Oc-
cupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1303 (1997). 
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the success rate of whites.
91
  The disparity could be explained based 
on the pricing system used by the Council.
92
  The regulations that 
were in effect at the time of the study only touched the very top of the 
low-income bracket.
93
  The study found that most successful appli-
cants under the FHA were elderly white women, but that determining 
the true need of the elderly and whether it was actually met were dif-
ficult to do.
94
 
While the ultimate success of the FHA might be debatable, it is 
unclear how allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently 
beneficial use in a municipality that has fully complied with its fair 
share obligation will remedy the deficiencies of the FHA.  The legisla-
ture’s purpose in implementing the FHA was to create a unified, 
comprehensive approach to tackling the housing shortfall.
95
  If the 
FHA is deficient it should be examined and revamped.  Given the 
recognized limitations on the grant of variances, they cannot be used 
to create the amount of housing envisioned by the FHA.
96
  The most 
effective way to handle the shortfall is in a comprehensive, state-wide 
initiative.  Allowing affordable housing to retain preferential treat-
ment in use variance applications in municipalities that have fully 
complied with the FHA undermines the purpose of a variance, leads 
to inefficient land use and usurps zoning boards’ authority to control 
the use of land.
97
 
 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 1304. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1305. 
 95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302(c) (West 2008) (“The interest of all citizens . . . 
would be best served by a comprehensive planning and implementation response to 
[the] constitutional obligation [announced in Mount Laurel I and II].”).  
 96 See Twp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover, 386 A.2d 421, 427 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1978) (discussing factors to consider in determining whether a Board 
of Adjustment has exceeded its authority in granting a variance for a project). 
 97 In fact at trial, Homes of Hope, Inc. argued that the difficulty of obtaining a 
variance for a use not deemed inherently beneficial was very difficult.   
It’s almost like equal protection where if you have – if you fall into the 
category of a suspect class, you have a chance, and if you don’t, you 
don’t have much of a chance, and that’s how it is with inherently bene-
ficial.  If you get into that inherently beneficial category, you have a 
fighting chance on a downhill road, and if you are not, my experience 
is you have almost no chance. 
See Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at app. DA13.   This argument, however, does 
not acknowledge the fact that variances are not intended to be easy to obtain.  See 
infra Part III.A. 
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III. VARIANCE PRACTICES 
A. Plan for the Future 
The benefits from zoning are numerous.  Zoning leads to effi-
cient uses of resources and planning.
98
  Municipal governments may 
wish to reduce the potential for car accidents by creating residential 
districts that tend to have less traffic than commercial districts.
99
  Pre-
dictable development is necessary to allocate funds to the develop-
ment of roads and manageable traffic patterns.
100
  Zoning allows a 
municipality to plan its water systems based on a projected need, and 
it helps to contain noxious fumes from industrial uses.
101
 
In New Jersey, a municipality’s right to implement zoning rules 
that control the use of land within its boundaries is based on the po-
lice powers found in the New Jersey State Constitution and has been 
codified by the New Jersey State Legislature.
102
  The importance of 
planning for development through zoning is evidenced by the stated 
intentions of the MLUL.
103
  One of the stated objectives of the MLUL 
is to control development in order to promote appropriate densities 
that will contribute to the well-being of the communities, neighbor-
hoods, and environment.
104
  A municipality’s zoning ordinances are 
presumptively reasonable.
105
  To reflect the policy of comprehensive 
zoning, which underlies the MLUL, variances should be granted spa-
ringly and under exceptional circumstances.
106
  In fact, William Cox, a 
foremost authority on New Jersey land use and zoning, writes, “Be-
cause there is a strong legislative policy favoring land use planning by 
 
 98 See Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 392–94 (1926) (stating var-
ious benefits associated with zoning); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2(a)–(o) (West 
1991) (listing various purposes for zoning). 
 99 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392–94.   
 100 See id.  
 101 See id.  
 102 See generally Fischer v. Twp. of Bedminster, 93 A.2d 378, 381–83 (N.J. 1952). 
 103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2(e) (West 2009). 
 104 Id.  
 105 Ne. Towers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Patterson, 744 A.2d 190, 195 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 106 Id.; Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 778 
A.2d 482, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001); see also Pierce Estates Corp., v. 
Bridgewater Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 697 A.2d. 195, 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1997) (“[B]ecause use variances tend to impair sound zoning, they should be 
granted sparingly and with great caution. . . .  Consequently, ‘an applicant bears a 
heavy burden in overcoming a denial.’” (internal citations omitted)).  
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ordinance rather than by variance, the grant of a [use] variance will 
always be the exception rather than the rule.”
107
 
New Jersey’s preference for planning through zoning is also seen 
in the standard of judicial review afforded to a grant or denial of a 
use variance.  Because zoning boards have a peculiar knowledge of 
local conditions, their decisions on whether to grant a variance are 
viewed deferentially.
108
  Notably, “[e]ven when doubt is entertained as 
to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no 
judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of dis-
cretion by the public agencies involved.”
109
  When under judicial re-
view, the presumption in favor of planning via zoning manifests itself 
in the form of greater deference to a zoning board’s decision to deny 
a variance than to a grant of a variance.
110
 
Specifically, judicial review of a zoning board’s decision is li-
mited; “[a] board’s decision is presumptively valid, and is reversible 
only if arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. . . .  In sum, courts will 
defer to a decision if it is supported by the record and is not so arbi-
trary, capricious or unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discre-
tion.”
111
  Furthermore, each case that involves a grant or a denial of a 
use variance should be reviewed on its own facts,
112
 which is signifi-
cant because many cases that involve an assessment of affordable 
housing as an inherently beneficial use, including Homes of Hope, ap-
pear to simply declare the project an inherently beneficial use be-
cause it has been one in the past.
113
  Courts are inconsistent: some 
courts reference in their analysis a need for an inherently beneficial 
use, and others only refer to precedent in declaring a use inherently 
beneficial.
114
  Clearly, despite this inconsistency, “determining wheth-
 
 107  COX, supra note 23, at 182; see also Pierce Estates Corp., 697 A.2d at 199.  
 108 Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199; see also Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash. 
Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427, at *10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that “[b]oard decisions are presumed va-
lid and the party attacking them has the burden of proving otherwise” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).  
 109 Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199 (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sea Girt, 
45 N.J. 268, 296 (N.J. 1965)). 
 110 Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explain-
ing that “[c]ourts give greater deference to variance denials than to grants of va-
riances, since variances tend to impair sound zoning”). 
 111 Smart SMR v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d 1271, 1280 
(N.J. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 112 See Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990). 
 113 See infra Part III.C.  
 114 See infra Part III.C. 
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er a use is inherently beneficial is a fact-sensitive inquiry, even where 
the use involves health care or hospital facilities.”
115
 
Because evaluation of a use variance is a fact-intensive inquiry, a 
use variance application to build affordable housing should include 
an assessment of a municipality’s need.  The nature of a fact-intensive 
inquiry would seemingly lead to the conclusion that a particular set of 
facts in one municipality that give rise to an inherently beneficial 
standard for a use variance would not necessarily do so in another.  
Yet affordable housing remains an inherently beneficial use despite 
the fact that the conditions in one municipality might not warrant 
such preferential status.  This is clearly the exception swallowing the 
rule.  Variances are intended to be used sparingly,
116
 yet there cur-
rently seems to be a per se rule that no matter the factual scenario, 
affordable housing will remain an inherently beneficial use. 
B. Procedure for Obtaining a Variance: Inherently and Non-Inherently 
Beneficial Use Standards 
The MLUL governs the ability of a zoning board to grant a va-
riance.  Under the MLUL a variance may be granted for special rea-
sons to allow a departure from the planned use of the area to permit 
“[a] use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use 
or principal structure.”
117
  The MLUL does not provide a definition 
for what constitutes a special reason to grant a variance.  The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey has determined that a special reason for 
granting a variance exists if the reason falls within the purposes of 
zoning as specified by the MLUL in section 40:55D-2.
118
  One purpose 
of zoning set forth in section 40:55D-2 of the MLUL, upon which ap-
plicants most commonly rely as a special reason for granting a use va-
riance, is that the proposed use promotes the general welfare.
119
 
To obtain a use variance, an applicant must satisfy both positive 
and negative criteria.
120
  The positive criteria are satisfied by showing a 
special reason as listed in section 40:55D-2 of the MLUL.
121
  If the use 
is non-inherently beneficial and the asserted special reason is the 
promotion of the general welfare, which in most cases it is, the appli-
 
 115 Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 501. 
 116 Id. at 495; see also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.  
 117 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70(d)(1) (West 2009). 
 118 Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1990). 
 119 Id.   
 120 Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d 
1271, 1278 (N.J. 1997). 
 121 See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532–33. 
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cant must also show the proposed use is particularly well-suited for 
the target parcel of land because “nearly all lawful uses of property 
promote . . . the general welfare.  Thus, if the general social benefits 
of any individual use—without reference to its particular location—
were to be regarded as an adequate special reason, a special reason 
almost always would exist for a use variance.”
122
  A proposed use that is 
determined to be an inherently beneficial use, however, will pre-
sumptively satisfy the positive criteria without any requirement that 
the use be particularly well-suited for the target property.
123
 
To satisfy the negative criteria for a non-inherently beneficial 
use, the applicant must show both that the variance can be granted 
without substantial detriment to the public good and that the va-
riance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the 
master plan and zoning ordinance.
124
  The applicant must meet what 
is referred to as an enhanced quality of proof.
125
  Specifically, “clear 
and specific findings” must demonstrate “that the variance sought is 
not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and 
zoning ordinance.”
126
  The proofs and findings must “reconcile the 
proposed use variance with the zoning ordinance’s omission of the 
use from those permitted in the zoning district.”
127
 
The first prong of the negative criteria focuses on the variance’s 
effect on the surrounding area and buildings.
128
  Under the first 
prong the relevant question is whether allowing the variance will 
cause damage to the character of the neighborhood, resulting in sub-
stantial detriment to the public good.
129
  The second prong asks 
whether the proposed use will undermine the intent of the zoning 
plan.
130
  Cox explains this prong focuses on “the extent to which a 
grant of the variance would constitute an arrogation of governing 
body and planning board authority.”
131
  The New Jersey Supreme 
 
 122 Kohl v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 234 A.2d 385, 391 (N.J. 1967). 
 123 Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 603 A.2d 30, 34 (N.J. 1992). 
 124 Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc., 704 A.2d at 1278.  
 125 Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 119 (N.J. 1987). 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 566 A.2d 
575, 579 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (quoting Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 
121 n.12 (N.J. 1987)). 
 129 Id.  
 130 See id. 
 131 COX, supra note 23, at 252 (explaining that this requirement helps make it 
clear that “municipalities should make zoning decisions by ordinance rather than by 
variance”).   
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Court instructed that, with regard to the negative criteria, “[t]he 
board’s resolution should contain sufficient findings, based on the 
proofs submitted, to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has ana-
lyzed the master plan and zoning ordinance, and determined that the 
governing body’s prohibition of the proposed use is not incompatible 
with a grant of the variance.”
132
  If a proposed use is deemed to be in-
herently beneficial, the applicant does not need to meet the higher 
quality of proof to satisfy the negative criteria, but a balancing test 
still applies.
133
  When a zoning board is confronted with an applica-
tion for a use variance to construct an inherently beneficial use, the 
supreme court suggests a zoning board should first identify the public 
interest at stake, acknowledging that some uses are more beneficial 
than others.
134
  Second, a board should identify the detrimental ef-
fect, if any, of granting the variance.
135
  Third, a board can alleviate 
the detrimental effects by imposing reasonable conditions on the 
grant of the variance.
136
  Fourth, the board should weigh the positive 
and the negative criteria to determine whether the former outweighs 
the latter.
137
  Only once both the positive and negative criteria are met 
should a zoning board approve a use variance.
138
 
C. The Inherently Beneficial Use Doctrine Explained 
The inherently beneficial use doctrine is a judicially created doc-
trine.
139
  Because no definition exists for what qualifies as a special 
reason in the MLUL, the courts were left to determine what type of 
use would qualify as a special reason for a use variance.
140
  The courts 
created the doctrine to handle a narrow spectrum of uses that were 
deemed so beneficial to the community that municipalities should 
use a favorable approach when considering applications for such 
uses.
141
  Because of the perceived benefits of these uses, municipalities 
were encouraged to take into account not only their need but also 
 
 132 Medici v. Madison Property Co. No. 4, 526 A.2d 109, 121 (N.J. 1987). 
 133 Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 778 
A.2d 482, 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 134 Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 603 A.2d 30, 37 (N.J. 1992); Med. Ctr. at Prin-
ceton, 778 A.2d at 496.    
 135 Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496.  
 136 Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496. 
 137 Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496–97. 
 138 See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 
A.2d 1271, 1278 (N.J. 1998).  
 139 COX, supra note 23, at 187. 
 140 See Kohl v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 234 A.2d 385, 389 (N.J. 1967). 
 141 COX, supra note 23, at 187. 
BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  7:45 AM 
2011] COMMENT 337 
the regional need.
142
  To determine if something is an inherently 
beneficial use is a fact-intensive inquiry, even when it comes to such 
proposed uses as hospitals or schools.
143
 
One criticism of the inherently beneficial use doctrine is that it 
does not consider site suitability as is required for non-inherently 
beneficial uses.  An article appearing in the New Jersey Planner advo-
cated a reconsideration of which criterion are relaxed for inherently 
beneficial uses.
144
  The author wrote that “‘[s]ite suitability’ should be 
at or near the top of zoning objectives; yet suitability receives no con-
sideration if the use is ‘inherently’ beneficial.”
145
  The article goes on 
to argue that “[s]ite suitability should be shown for all variant uses.  
Why shouldn’t there be substantive special reasons for all variant uses 
instead of a compulsory and automatic process that ignores the es-
sence of zoning, i.e. the appropriate use of land.”
146
 
This argument is particularly salient in Homes of Hope.  Eastamp-
ton complied with its FHA requirements, submitted a housing plan, 
received substantive certification, and has actually constructed a sur-
plus of units.
147
  Despite all of this, a builder was able to request a va-
riance and have it reviewed under a preferential standard without any 
consideration to the suitability of the land for the purpose.
148
  This 
precedent threatens sound zoning principles.  It will allow for uses 
that have a higher density than the use for which the zone is de-
signed, which potentially will lead to increased demand on systems 
and increased traffic.  It gives the builder the upper hand in deter-
mining where to put affordable housing without reference to the pol-
icy behind zoning.  Therefore, an application for a use variance to 
build affordable housing in a fully FHA-compliant municipality 
should be reviewed in light of the suitability of the land for the use as 
provided by the non-inherently beneficial use analysis.  This will allow 
for adequate planning for the needs of particular zones and pro-
motes efficient use of land. 
 
 142 Id. 
 143 Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 501. 
 144 Donald M. Ross, ‘Inherently Beneficial’ Re-Thought, N.J. PLANNER, Spring 1998 at 
U-4. 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. 
 147 Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at 14.  
 148 See supra Part III.A.  
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D. The Inherently Beneficial Use Doctrine in Action 
Applicants for variances have relied on the inherently beneficial 
use doctrine in an attempt to establish the positive criteria for a mul-
titude of uses.  Generally, courts reference some form of need when 
discussing the applicability of the doctrine to the proposed use.  In 
overturning a grant of a variance for an expansion of a nonconform-
ing use, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on the fact that no 
need for the expansion had been shown.  In Kohl v. Borough of Fair 
Lawn, a dairy requested a variance to substantially increase its non-
conforming use.
149
  The special reason advanced for the grant of the 
variance was that the processing and distribution of milk served the 
general welfare.
150
  Turning to a non-inherently beneficial use analy-
sis, the court noted that while processing milk did serve the general 
welfare, that reason alone did not provide a basis for the grant of a 
variance.
151
  The court found no showing that an expansion of the use 
on that particular piece of land was necessary for the promotion of 
the general welfare.
152
  The court further noted that even if the 
present location was necessary to the welfare of the area, no evidence 
indicated that the municipality had any need for the additional milk 
supply that would be created by the expansion.
153
  Despite the fact 
that the court referenced a need while engaging in a non-inherently 
beneficial analysis; the discussion is noteworthy because it illustrates a 
hesitancy to subvert the established zones by issuing a variance for a 
use for which there is no need. 
Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to find 
that a cell phone tower constitutes an inherently beneficial use.  
When contemplating whether a cell phone tower should be an inhe-
rently beneficial use, the court explained that “inherently beneficial 
uses are generally limited in number within a single municipality.”
154
  
The court went on to note two applications had already been made 
for a use variance to build cell phone towers in the area, and the pos-
sibility of more led to concern about a potentially large number of 
communications providers who might wish to install any number of 
towers on undesignated locations throughout the state.
155
  In another 
 
 149 234 A.2d 385, 387 (N.J. 1967). 
 150 Id. at 391. 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. at 391–92.  
 154 Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 
A.2d 1271, 1281 (N.J. 1998). 
 155 See id. at 1282.  
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case dealing with a variance for a cell phone tower, the appellate divi-
sion found the applicant could not show that the cell phone tower 
would in fact improve the particular municipality’s communications, 
and therefore, it was not an inherently beneficial use.
156
  This decision 
led William Cox to surmise that “conceivably more compelling bene-
ficial uses such as a school or hospital could be found not to be inhe-
rently beneficial under particular circumstances.”
157
  Presumably, such 
circumstances would exist where a municipality and its surrounding 
areas had no need for the proposed use. 
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a 
hospital for emotionally disturbed persons constituted a special rea-
son for a use variance.
158
  The court paid particular attention to the 
urgent need for a hospital of this kind.
159
  It found that a municipality 
may consider a need that exists beyond its own borders.
160
  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged a similar need in Sica v. Board of 
Adjustment of Township of Wall for a head trauma center.
161
  In that 
case, the applicant received a certificate of need from the New Jersey 
Department of Health.
162
  The court easily deemed the head trauma 
center an inherently beneficial use and cited the certificate from the 
Department of Health as evidence of the need for such a center.
163
 
In another case, however, the appellate division found that a 
drug-treatment facility geared towards Jewish males did not constitute 
an inherently beneficial use.
164
  The court noted that extensive evi-
dence existed substantiating a need for this kind of rehabilitation fa-
cility in the area, but no evidence existed that the Orthodox Jewish 
community in the area had a need for such a facility.
165
  In distin-
guishing this case from Sica, the court mentioned that in Sica the ap-
plicant for a use variance had a certificate of need from the Depart-
ment of Health, and in this case, the applicant did not.
166
  This case is 
 
 156 See Pierce Estates Corp. v. Bridgewater Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 697 
A.2d 195, 200–01 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
 157 COX, supra note 23, at 189. 
 158 See Kunzler v. Hoffman, 225 A.2d 321, 326 (N.J. 1966).  
 159 See id.  
 160 Id.  
 161 See 603 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1992). 
 162 Id. at 34. 
 163 See id.  
 164 See Jewish Family Serv., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Bergenfield, No. A-
4450-04T5, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 795, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 
13, 2006).  
 165 Id. at *9. 
 166 Id. at *9–10.  
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notable because it demonstrates that even though a general need 
may exist for a particular use, the local zoning board is fully capable 
and better positioned to determine whether a particular need within 
the community is satisfied by the proposed inherently beneficial use.  
In this case, the zoning board determined that the proposed inhe-
rently beneficial use did not fulfill a demonstrated need within the 
community and therefore did not constitute an inherently beneficial 
use.
167
 
As the cases discussed above indicate, a general need for a use 
may be insufficient to qualify a proposed project as an inherently 
beneficial use.  But generally, courts reference some need for the 
proposed use when discussing an application for a use variance.  A 
discussion as to the necessity of a use is appropriate and imperative in 
order to foster efficient uses of land and would correctly reflect the 
preference to contain and plan for particular uses through the adop-
tion of zoning ordinances. 
IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AS AN INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL USE 
A. The Early Cases 
The most frequently referenced case for the notion that afford-
able housing is an inherently beneficial use is DeSimone v. Greater En-
glewood Housing Corp. No. 1.
168
  In DeSimone, a builder requested a va-
riance to build 146 units of cluster-type, two-story apartments on a 
ten-acre parcel of land in a portion of the city zoned for single-family 
dwellings and inhabited predominately by whites.
169
  The develop-
ment was proposed in order to allow for relocation of residents from 
another portion of the city, which was predominately black and con-
sisted of dilapidated housing.
170
  The Board of Adjustment for the City 
of Englewood granted the variance and noted that the project served 
the general welfare because the city suffered from a large housing 
shortage for low-income families.
171
  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
held as follows: 
[I]n the light of public policy and the law of the land, that public 
or, as here, semi-public housing accommodations to provide safe, 
sanitary and decent housing, to relieve and replace substandard 
living conditions or to furnish housing for minority or underprivi-
 
 167 See id. at *5. 
 168 267 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1970). 
 169 Id. at 33. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 37.  
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leged segments of the population outside of ghetto areas is a spe-
cial reason adequate to meet that requirement of [the MLUL] 
and to ground a variance.
172
 
The facts surrounding the DeSimone case and the nature of the chal-
lenges to the variance grant caused the court to be wary of the moti-
vation behind the challenges.
173
  The court noted that a true desire to 
vindicate the policy of the statutes invoked was not apparent, but ra-
ther, the court found a desire to oppose the project at all costs.
174
 
In a subsequent case, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrangled 
with whether to declare private affordable housing an inherently 
beneficial use such that no consideration of site suitability would be 
required.
175
  It decided not to answer the question and limited its 
holding in DeSimone to public or semi-public housing projects.
176
  But 
the Law Division found that private multi-family, moderate-income 
dwellings constituted a special reason for justifying a variance.
177
  In-
terestingly, the court deemed it not an inherently beneficial use but 
rather “a special reason.”
178
  Important, though, is the court’s discus-
sion regarding the need within the municipality for affordable hous-
ing as evidenced by expert opinion.
179
  After declaring that a special 
reason existed, the court did not subsequently engage in a site-
suitability discussion so the court likely meant, and the case has been 
 
 172 Id. at 38–39.  
 173 See id. at 35. 
 174 DeSimone, 267 A.2d at 35. 
 175 Fobe Assoc. v. Mayor of Demarest, 379 A.2d 31, 39 (N.J. 1977), abrogated by S. 
Burlington NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 431 n.15 (N.J. 1983).  
Limiting DeSimone the court stated,  
[T]he inquiry [in this case] turns to whether provision of small middle-
income apartment units in Demarest is ‘inherently’ in service of the 
general welfare so as to warrant a d. variance . . . .   
     [O]ne is hard put to respond to the insistence that if adequate 
housing of all categories of people is an absolute essential in promo-
tion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation, as 
stated in Mount Laurel . . . , a variance to provide additional rental 
housing in a region which plainly needs it is ‘inherently’ for the gener-
al welfare . . . [w]e propose to leave definitive resolution of this . . . to a 
future case . . . .  
Fobe Assoc., 379 A.2d at 39–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
 176 Id. at 40–41.  
 177 Brunetti v. Mayor of Madison, 325 A.2d 851, 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1974). 
 178 Id. 
 179 See id.  
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construed as establishing, that private, multi-family housing is an in-
herently beneficial use.
180
 
In Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Township Zoning Board of Ad-
justment, the Law Division held the conversion of a single-family dwel-
ling into low-income apartments was an inherently beneficial use.
181
  
The court found that the fact that Homes of Hope, Inc. is a private 
developer did not preclude its project from qualifying for the prefe-
rential treatment of the inherently beneficial use doctrine.
182
  Unlike 
Brunetti, this case lacks any reference to a documented need for af-
fordable housing within the municipality.
183
  As recently as 2008, the 
appellate division found that construction of affordable housing is an 
inherently beneficial use for the purposes of satisfying the positive 
criteria of a use variance.
184
  That opinion contains no discussion of a 
need for affordable housing nor does it contain any discussion of 
whether the particular municipality had satisfied its FHA obligation.  
The court merely stated that “affordable housing has been held to be 
an inherently beneficial use.”
185
  These cases demonstrate the evolu-
tion of the inherently beneficial use doctrine in the affordable hous-
ing context and the largely cursory review of whether a proposed 
project satisfies an established need within the municipality. 
B. Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning 
Board 
Homes of Hope, Inc., a non-profit provider of affordable hous-
ing, requested a use variance from the Board to build eight multi-
family affordable housing units on a lot zoned solely for single-family 
dwellings.
186
  The density limit in the zone was three units per acre; 
Homes of Hope, Inc. proposed a density of 9.4 units per acre.
187
  Ad-
ditionally, Homes of Hope, Inc.’s proposed use required a bulk va-
riance from the minimum setback requirements; the zone required a 
 
 180 See Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 566 
A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1989). 
 181 Id. at 577. 
 182 Id. at 577–78.  
 183 See id. at 577 (“The creation of housing accommodations for the underprivi-
leged at a reduced cost makes an important contribution to the general welfare.  
Homes’ plan, in operation, adds considerably to that contribution.”). 
 184 Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash. Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2, 
2008 N.J. Super. LEXIS 427, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2008). 
 185 Id. at *12.  
 186 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 187 Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA53. 
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forty-foot setback, but because of the configuration of the lot, Homes 
of Hope, Inc. could only provide a twenty-foot setback.
188
  Homes of 
Hope, Inc. argued that the proposed construction of affordable hous-
ing on the lot was an inherently beneficial use.
189
 
The Board denied the use variance, bulk variance, and other re-
quests by Homes of Hope, Inc.,
190
  reasoning that “surplus affordable 
housing proposed by [Homes of Hope, Inc.] is not inherently benefi-
cial, since Eastampton Township [had] already satisfied its affordable 
housing obligation for the 3rd Round COAH cycle”
191
 and had a sur-
plus of twenty-one units.
192
  The Board further opined that the pro-
posed density would undermine the purpose of the zoning in direct 
contravention of the MLUL and that the proposed use would not 
promote “appropriate . . . aesthetics of the lot, neighborhood and 
the . . . [z]one.”
193
  Additionally, the Board found the proposed on-
street parking capacity was incompatible with the typical off-street 
parking of a residential neighborhood.
194
 
Homes of Hope, Inc. appealed the Board’s decision and argued 
that the Board should have to reconsider the application for the use 
variance in light of the inherently beneficial status of affordable hous-
ing.
195
  The trial court agreed with Homes of Hope, Inc. that afforda-
ble housing is an inherently beneficial use and instructed the Board 
to review the application for a use variance in light of its decree.
196
  
The Board appealed the decision, and the appellate division affirmed 
the trial court’s decision.
197
  Specifically, the appellate division found 
that “affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use.”
198
  The court 
further stated: 
A municipality’s compliance with COAH regulations does not 
change the necessary site-specific analysis necessary for a [use] va-
riance.  Compliance protects the municipality from litigation and 
a builder’s remedy . . . but it does not impact the public policy of 
this State that low and moderate income affordable housing pro-
 
 188 Id. at DA32.  
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at DA37. 
 191 Id. at DA33–34.  
 192 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 
1128, 1131 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).  
 193 Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA33. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at DA10.  
 196 Id. at DA24.  
 197 See Homes of Hope, 976 A.2d at 1134.  
 198 See id. at 1131. 
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motes the general welfare and constitutes a special reason to sup-
port a “d” variance.
199
 
The concurring opinion, however, found that it was not “illogical to 
conclude that once a municipality has actually provided its fair share 
of affordable housing, further affordable housing projects need not 
retain their status as inherently beneficial uses for the purpose of ‘d’ 
variance application.”
200
  The concurrence further stated an act of the 
legislature would be required to declare that affordable housing is 
not an inherently beneficial use for the purpose of obtaining a use 
variance.
201
 
C. Emotions Run High in Wake of Homes of Hope 
In the wake of the appellate division’s decision, a firestorm of 
criticism erupted.  Assemblyman Scott T. Rumana, a Republican 
representing the Fortieth District of New Jersey,
202
 declared that he 
intended to draft legislation to address the decision.
203
  He pondered 
the utility of “having local land use boards if officials in Trenton or 
judges in a courtroom can impose their will over the decisions made 
at a local level with [the] best interests of property taxpayers in 
mind.”
204
  State Senator Sean T. Kean, a Republican representing the 
Eleventh District of New Jersey,
205
 proclaimed the “ruling has the po-
tential to lead to overcrowded schools and even greater property tax 
increases in [his district] and across the state.”
206
  He went on to say 
“taxpayers have already paid millions of dollars for affordable hous-
ing plans that have now been rendered useless.”
207
 
Another article stated that the director of the New Jersey Sierra 
Club found the decision outrageous because it “overturn[ed] other 
case law that is more on point, including the Mount Laurel II deci-
 
 199 Id. at 1133–34.  
 200 Id. at 1136 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
 201 See id.  
 202 Assemblyman Scott T. Rumana (R), N.J. LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/members/bio.asp?Leg=297 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 203 Press Release, Assemblyman Rumana Says Property Taxpayers Will Never See 
Relief From Corzine’s and Court’s Housing Mandates (Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.njassemblyrepublicans.com/press_release.php?id=953.   
 204 Id.  
 205 Biography, SENATOR SEAN T. KEAN, N.J.’S 11TH LEGISLATIVE DIST., 
http://seankean.senatenj.com/biography.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 206 Senator Sean T. Kean Slams COAH Court Ruling, SENATOR SEAN T. KEAN, N.J.’S 
11TH LEGISLATIVE DIST. (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.senatenj.com/index.php/ 
seankean/sen-sean-kean-slams-coah-court-ruling/4067.  
 207 Id.  
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sion” and that the Homes of Hope decision “declare[d] open season on 
local towns and their zoning.”
208
  The same article quoted the Inde-
pendent gubernatorial candidate, Chris Daggett, as saying that “the 
ruling gives town[s] no incentive to comply with COAH” and would 
lead to “explosive litigation.”
209
  Additionally, the League of Munici-
palities, a voluntary association authorized by State statute to help 
municipalities govern more effectively, to which all 566 municipalities 
belong, called upon the municipalities to adopt a resolution in reac-
tion to Homes of Hope.
210
  The resolution provided by the League of 
Municipalities urged the legislature to adopt a rule which would pre-
vent any municipality from having to accept more than its fair share 
of housing by way of variance.
211
 
D. Criticism Overlooked Principled Reasons for Disagreeing with 
Homes of Hope 
Most of the public outcry
212
 as a result of the Homes of Hope deci-
sion was exaggerated.  But there are principled policy reasons that 
support Eastampton’s position and that harmonize zoning ordin-
ances, variance procedures, and the FHA.  The reasons for opposing 
the Homes of Hope decision that are discussed below and in Part V in-
clude the goal of efficient land use and to that end, the preference 
that development in New Jersey occur through planned zoning ra-
ther than through the use of a variance which is intended to be 
granted only for exceptional circumstances.
213
  Further policy argu-
ments are grounded in the notion that zoning boards are particularly 
well-suited to make decisions regarding the utility of a potential use 
within the municipality.
214
  While individual legislators have advanced 
potential solutions to the legal issue presented in Homes of Hope and 
the deficiencies of the FHA, any solution that is adopted should ulti-
mately focus on the most efficient use of land and resources, rather 
 
 208 Tom Hester, Sr., N.J. Appeals Court’s Affordable Housing Ruling Sparks Outrage, 
N.J. NEWSROOM (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/nj-
appeals-courts-affordable-housing-ruling-sparks-outrage. 
 209 Id.  
 210 Sample Resolution for Legislative Action on Eastampton COAH Decision, N.J. STATE 
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.njslom.org/ 
ml091409_coah.html.  
 211 Id.  
 212 See supra Part IV.C. 
 213 See supra Part III.A. 
 214 See id.  
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than create an opportunity for municipalities to escape responsibility 
for affordable housing shortfalls.
215
 
First, the possibility that municipalities will automatically decide 
not to participate in the COAH process as a result of this case is un-
likely.
216
  Municipalities have other important reasons to comply with 
COAH, including the fact that the community would seek to avoid 
the possibility of costly litigation challenging a municipality’s zoning 
ordinances as exclusionary.
217
  A former director of COAH realized 
that affordable housing is a hard sell in municipalities but noted that 
the litigation costs associated with fighting an exclusionary zoning 
lawsuit outweighed the costs associated with creating a housing plan 
as the COAH process dictates.
218
  Furthermore, participation in the 
COAH process affords a municipality several administrative remedies 
that must be exhausted prior to litigation if its zoning laws are chal-
lenged as being exclusionary.
219
 
Fears that this case “declares open season” on municipalities’ 
zoning laws are also misplaced.
220
  The purpose of a variance is to 
grant specific relief from a zoning restriction on a specific parcel of 
land.
221
  Case law establishes that a variance cannot be so vast as to 
cover large tracts of land: 
The individuality of the variance approach is underscored by the 
limitation of the board of adjustment’s power to a specific piece 
of property, a limitation expressed [by the MLUL] . . . when a 
large tract or a substantial area comprising several tracts is in-
volved, the situation is beyond the intended scope of the variance 
procedure.
222
 
If a zoning board granted a variance for such a purpose, it would be 
beyond the scope of authority granted to the zoning board.
223
  Fears 
that the Homes of Hope decision can be used as a tool by which devel-
opers can run roughshod over a municipality’s zoning ordinances are 
unfounded.  Zoning ordinances will not be decimated because muni-
cipalities that are inclined to participate in COAH will likely continue 
 
 215 See infra Part.V. 
 216 See Hester, supra note 208.  
 217 See COAH Fact Sheet, supra note 64. 
 218 Arthur Bernard, Planning for Affordable Housing, N.J. PLANNER, Spring 1996, at 
U-1.  
 219 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 2009). 
 220 Hester, supra note 208.   
 221 See Dover Twp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover Twp., 386 A.2d 421, 426–27 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
 222 See id. at 427 (internal quotations omitted).  
 223 Id. at 427. 
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to do so to avoid litigation costs and to avail themselves of administra-
tive remedies provided by the FHA.  While this decision will not per-
mit developers to completely circumvent zoning ordinances, as some 
claimed,
224
 it does, however, expand the role a use variance can play 
in development.  Use variances are regarded as tools to be used only 
in exceptional circumstances and with great caution,
225
 yet the Homes 
of Hope decision will enable a builder to request a use variance and 
have it reviewed under a preferential standard with little regard to 
whether the municipality has a particular need for additional afford-
able housing and also without any regard to whether the land is well-
suited for the use.  This effectively relaxes the extraordinary role use 
variances are intended to play in development. 
Second, Homes of Hope did not chisel away at the Mount Laurel 
doctrine.
226
  Both Mount Laurel cases addressed the prevalent use of 
exclusionary zoning, which municipalities used to keep out what 
some deemed undesirable segments of the population.
227
  Mount Lau-
rel I and Mount Laurel II decreed a constitutional obligation on the 
part of all municipalities to provide housing for all segments of the 
population within their zoning ordinances.
228
  Homes of Hope, by con-
trast, deals with the appropriate standard to apply to a particular use 
in an application for a variance.
229
  The basic notion that affordable 
housing provides benefits for a community and that a municipality 
cannot actively refuse to include it within its borders underlies the le-
gal issues confronted in the Mount Laurel cases and Homes of Hope.  
But Mount Laurel dealt with what is constitutionally required of a mu-
nicipality in creating zoning ordinances,
230
 and Homes of Hope con-
cerned what aspects of a proposed use must be considered in a use 
variance application.
231
 
Contrary to the criticism that Homes of Hope overruled the Mount 
Laurel cases, in deciding Homes of Hope, the appellate division did not 
view either the MLUL or the FHA procedure as being intertwined at 
all.
232
  In fact, the Homes of Hope decision indicated that the FHA 
 
 224 See supra Part IV.C. 
 225 See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.  
 226 Hester, supra note 208.  
 227 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 228 See id.  
 229 See Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 230 See supra Part II.A–B.  
 231 See Homes of Hope, 976 A.2d at 1130. 
 232 Id. at 1133–34. 
BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  7:45 AM 
348 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:319 
process, which gives meaning to the constitutional obligation created 
in the Mount Laurel cases, has no bearing at all on whether an appli-
cation for a use variance to build affordable housing is an inherently 
beneficial use.  Therefore, the appellate division in deciding Homes of 
Hope clearly did not think that it was making a ruling that would jeo-
pardize either Mount Laurel I or II. 
V. THE MISAPPLICATION OF INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL USE STATUS  
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
In a fully compliant FHA municipality,
233
 affordable housing 
should be reviewed under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis 
when it requires a use variance to be built.
234
  Because a municipality, 
like Eastampton, has complied with its FHA requirements and has 
fulfilled its regional need of affordable housing, there is no demon-
strable need that warrants the preferential treatment afforded by the 
inherently beneficial use analysis.  Therefore, utilizing the non-
inherently beneficial use analysis will lead to more efficient uses of 
land by ensuring that the use is well-suited for the land on which it 
will be placed.  It would also harmonize the FHA and the MLUL be-
cause the FHA would remain the primary, cohesive legislation aimed 
at solving the state-wide housing shortfall.  Further, the non-
inherently beneficial use analysis would enable zoning boards to fully 
utilize their particular knowledge and understanding of local condi-
tions in order to best control development within its borders and 
would honor the notion that a variance should only be used in excep-
tional circumstances. 
A. Homes of Hope Disregards the True Nature of a Variance 
The Homes of Hope decision allows the variance process to be 
used to effectively circumvent zoning rules.  The decision runs coun-
 
 233 This Comment only suggests that the inherently beneficial use analysis not be 
used in municipalities that have actually constructed their fair share of affordable 
housing as assigned by the Council.  In all other municipalities, the inherently bene-
ficial use analysis should be applied to use variance applications to build affordable 
housing.  
 234 This Comment should not be construed as arguing that there is no longer a 
shortage of affordable housing in New Jersey or that affordable housing is not bene-
ficial to all of New Jersey’s municipalities.  Rather, the aim of this Comment is solely 
to advocate that once a municipality has complied with its FHA requirements, an ap-
plication for a use variance to build affordable housing should not receive preferen-
tial treatment because the need for such treatment no longer exists.  The principle 
reason for this argument is that a variance should not be used as a tool to subvert lo-
cal zoning restrictions and should not be granted without consideration to the land 
on which it will be put.   
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ter to the notion that each variance case should be reviewed on its 
own facts
235
 and that development should be primarily conducted 
through zoning ordinances.
236
  The general rule is that the judgment 
of a planning board should prevail because of the board’s unique 
understanding of local conditions.
237
  The Homes of Hope per se rule 
that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use undermines 
the zoning system, causes inefficiencies in land use, and violates the 
concept that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that 
of a board’s because of the board’s unique understanding of local 
conditions. 
Additionally, a per se rule that affordable housing is an inherent-
ly beneficial use conflicts with the assertion that deference should be 
given to a zoning board’s decision to deny a variance
238
 and that all 
variance applications are to be reviewed on their own facts.
239
  Review-
ing a grant or denial of a variance on its own facts would seem to in-
dicate situations could arise in which a use, deemed inherently bene-
ficial in one municipality, would not be so in another.  In fact, 
William Cox stated that a doctor’s office, which might be inherently 
beneficial in one portion of the country where doctor’s offices are 
rare or nonexistent, is not considered inherently beneficial in New 
 
 235 See Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990). 
 236 See supra Part III.A. 
 237 See Burbidge, 568 A.2d at 532 (stating that “[b]oards of adjustment, because of 
their peculiar knowledge of location conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in the 
exercise of delegated discretion” (internal citations omitted)); Grubbs v. Slothower, 
913 A.2d 137, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (stating “[b]ecause of its peculiar 
knowledge of local conditions, the Board’s factual findings are entitled to substantial 
deference and are presumed valid” (internal citations omitted)); Ne. Towers v. Zon-
ing Bd. of Adjustment of W. Paterson, 744 A.2d 190, 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000). 
It is not the role of the reviewing court to determine if the decision was 
wise or unwise . . . .  [B]ecause of [zoning boards’] peculiar knowledge 
of local conditions [zoning boards] must be allowed wide latitude in 
the exercise of delegated discretion.  Courts cannot substitute an inde-
pendent judgment for that of the boards in areas of factual disputes; 
neither will they exercise anew the original jurisdiction of such boards 
or trespass on their administrative work.  So long as the power exists to 
do the act complained of and there is substantial evidence to support 
it, the judicial branch of the government cannot interfere.  
Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199. (internal citations omitted). 
 238 Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d 
1271, 1280 (N.J. 1997) (“Judicial review of the decision of a Planning Board or Board 
of Adjustment ordinarily is limited.  A board’s decision is presumptively valid, and is 
reversible only if arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.” (internal citations omit-
ted)).  
 239 See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532 (“In determining whether to uphold the grant of 
a variance, the reviewing court must consider each case on its own facts.”). 
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Jersey.
240
  Creating a per se rule that a use is inherently beneficial in 
municipality Y because it was beneficial in municipality X undermines 
the notion that use variance applications should be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis.
241
 
A per se rule ignores the reality that conditions and circums-
tances vary from municipality to municipality.  For instance, in Eas-
tampton, affordable housing is not needed whereas in other munici-
palities that have not fully complied
242
 with their affordable housing 
requirement per the FHA, a need for affordable housing could be 
demonstrated and therefore warrant the preferential treatment asso-
ciated with the inherently beneficial use status.  If the deference af-
forded to a zoning board is to have any meaning, then the standard 
by which a use variance application to build affordable housing is re-
viewed should allow that board some latitude in determining what 
the actual needs of that municipality are.  Indeed, the concurring 
opinion in Homes of Hope stated that “it is not illogical to conclude 
that once a municipality has actually provided its fair share of afford-
able housing, further affordable housing projects need not retain 
their status as inherently beneficial uses . . . .”
243
  Because it is not il-
logical, zoning boards should be permitted the ability to make the 
decision without fearing subsequent litigation.  The decision in Homes 
of Hope effectively abandons the deference supposedly afforded to 
zoning boards by allowing the judiciary and developers to substitute 
their judgment for that of the zoning board. 
The Homes of Hope decision unnecessarily duplicates the efforts 
of the Council in fully FHA-compliant municipalities, fails to account 
for actual need or lack thereof for a proposed use within a municipal-
ity, and can lead to inefficient uses of land.  In some variance cases, 
courts utilize an individualized assessment of whether the municipali-
ty or region has a need for the proposed use, but such an assessment 
is generally not undertaken when it comes to use variance applica-
tions to build affordable housing.
244
  An individualized assessment in 
Homes of Hope would have reproduced an analysis similar to the one 
 
 240 COX, supra note 21, at 188–89. 
 241 See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532. 
 242 For a list of municipalities that have complied with the third round of COAH 
obligations, see Council on Affordable Housing, N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING,  http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/index.html (click 
“list of towns under COAH” to obtain an Excel spreadsheet listing compliant muni-
cipalities) (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
 243 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128, 
1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (Chambers, J., concurring). 
 244 See supra Part III.D.  But see Part IV.A. 
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performed by the Council.
245
  If the analysis for an application for a 
variance to build affordable housing were to follow a similar analysis 
as that used in Sica
246
 or Kohl,
247
 an applicant would need to show some 
evidence of a need for affordable housing in the municipality, which 
is not possible without infringing on the Council’s responsibility.  
Theoretically, a consideration of housing shortages would be needed 
within that municipality and the surrounding areas, and then a de-
termination would be made as to whether, given the shortage, a pro-
posed project would qualify as an inherently beneficial use satisfying a 
portion of that municipality’s need.  The Council is already responsi-
ble for determining the state-wide need for affordable housing and 
allocating a portion of that need to each municipality.
248
  Therefore, 
any court’s assessment of need would duplicate the efforts of the 
Council.  A duplication of efforts would be advantageous in those 
municipalities that refuse to comply with the FHA but is ultimately 
unnecessary in fully compliant municipalities. 
In fact, Homes of Hope, Inc. and the appellate division used the 
COAH’s own estimation for the number of unmet housing units in 
New Jersey in referencing a continued need for this preferential 
standard for affordable housing.
249
  Because the Council already gave 
substantive certification to Eastampton,
250
 it found that Eastampton 
had already met its portion of that need.  Additionally, in a fully 
compliant FHA municipality, a request for a use variance to build af-
fordable housing will resemble a builder’s remedy because the zon-
ing board will be precluded from disallowing the variance unless it 
finds the negative criteria cannot be met.  Allowing affordable hous-
ing to remain as an inherently beneficial use in Eastampton (or any 
other municipality that has fully complied with the FHA) duplicates 
the process that the FHA performs.  Arguably, this rule actually un-
dermines the FHA process by negating the planning that municipali-
ties have done to become compliant with the FHA and instead allows 
for the grant of a variance without any consideration as to the suita-
bility of the land for the purpose.  The result is a process that gives no 
 
 245 See supra Part II.C. 
 246 603 A.2d 30 (1992); see supra Part III.D.  
 247 234 A.2d 385 (1967); see supra Part III.D. 
 248 See supra Part II.C.  
 249 Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128, 
1134 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note 
82, at 17. 
 250 Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA33–34.  
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flexibility to zoning boards, abandons the purpose of the planning 
and variance system, and thereby leads to inefficient uses of land. 
The Homes of Hope decision also undermines the preference for 
development through zoning ordinances by disregarding the purpose 
of a variance.  The objective of a variance is to allow a particular use 
that is not permitted on a particular parcel of land in a zone because 
of the zoning ordinances but is nonetheless suitable for the land in 
question.
251
  Variances are not meant as a way to simply circumvent 
zoning ordinances.
252
  Because zoning through ordinances is pre-
ferred, variances are to be used sparingly.
253
  Where affordable hous-
ing is needed in a municipality, presumably as a result of a municipal-
ity’s failure to comply with the FHA, it should be deemed an 
inherently beneficial use.  If there is not a demonstrated need for af-
fordable housing within the community, the applicant should have to 
show site suitability.  To hold otherwise clearly causes the exception 
to swallow the rule by allowing a variance to be granted for less than 
exceptional circumstances and without consideration of suitability.  
While the grant of a variance is supposed to be used sparingly, Homes 
of Hope serves to swallow that rule.  The broad language used by the 
court implies that, despite the fact that a variance application re-
quires intensive inquiry, no factual scenario exists that would warrant 
affordable housing not to be considered as an inherently beneficial 
use.  Such a decision threatens to make the grant of a use variance 
more commonplace than is intended. 
Homes of Hope, Inc. essentially argued in its brief that if afford-
able housing lost its inherently beneficial use status, it would be im-
possible to get a variance.
254
  The perceived impossibility Homes of 
Hope, Inc. claimed is not necessarily a bad thing.  The difficultly as-
sociated with obtaining a use variance merely reflects a preference for 
development through the use of zoning.
255
  The MLUL requires that a 
zoning board review which of its zoning provisions were subject to 
requests for variances and submit a report to the governing body 
 
 251 See Dover Twp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover Twp., 386 A.2d 421, 426–27 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (“The variance power of the board of adjustment is . . . 
intended to accommodate individual situations which, for a statutorily stated reason, 
require relief from the restrictions and regulations otherwise uniformly applicable to 
the district as a whole.”).     
 252 See id.  
 253 COX, supra note 23, at 182; see supra Part III.A. 
 254 Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note 82, at 11 (“[T]he road for non-
inherently beneficial uses is nearly impossible to travel and affords local municipali-
ties almost absolute discretion.”). 
 255 See supra Part III.A. 
BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  7:45 AM 
2011] COMMENT 353 
about potential amendments and revisions.
256
  Presumably, this review 
and report requirement is meant to empower the governing body to 
adjust current zoning ordinances based on the types of variances re-
quested to make zoning more inclusive of those uses that required 
variances to be built, and minimize future requests for variances.
257
  
Because a FHA-compliant municipality has already planned for, and 
in Eastampton’s case already built, affordable housing, any recom-
mendations by the zoning board should already be reflected in the 
zoning. 
B. Solutions Should Focus on Efficient Land Use 
After the appellate division decided Homes of Hope, two New Jer-
sey state senators, Philip Haines (R-Burlington) and Christopher 
“Kip” Bateman (R-Somerset) announced intentions to introduce a 
bill amending the MLUL to rectify the decision of the appellate divi-
sion in Homes of Hope.258  Haines said the decision “flies in the face of 
common sense” and has caused us to “draft legislation to solve an is-
sue that shouldn’t have existed in the first place.”
259
  Bateman ex-
plained that the citizens of New Jersey were assured during the de-
bate over Mount Laurel that they would not be responsible for more 
than their fair share of affordable housing and that this case under-
mined those assurances.
260
  The proposed solution sought to add to 
the MLUL one simple line, which stated that “[n]o municipality shall 
be required by variance, or otherwise, to provide more than a fair 
share of affordable housing.”
261
  As of late 2010, the legislation ap-
pears to have been abandoned for a more drastic approach.
262
  Given 
 
 256 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70.1 (West 2009). 
 257 See, e.g., Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 119 (N.J. 1987) (“Similarly, the an-
nual reports by boards of adjustment summarizing variance requests throughout the 
year and recommending amendments to the zoning ordinance are designed to avoid 
successive appeals for the same types of variance by encouraging the governing body 
to amend the ordinance so that such appeals will be unnecessary.”). 
 258 Tom Hester, Sr., Bill Stemming from Affordable Housing Court Ruling to Be Intro-
duced, N.J. NEWSROOM (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com 
/state/bill-stemming-from-affordable-housing-court-ruling-to-be-introduced.  
 259 Id. 
 260 Id.  
 261 See Bill to Solve Ill-Advised Mount Laurel Court Case to Be Introduced, SENATOR PHIL 
HAINES, N.J.’S 8TH LEGISLATIVE DIST. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.senatenj.com 
/index.php/haines/bill-to-solve-ill-advised-mount-laurel-court-case-to-be-
introduced/4202.  
 262 See infra note 263 (briefly discussing additional legislation before the Senate 
that has been referred to the Senate Economic Growth Committee which takes an 
entirely different approach). 
BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  7:45 AM 
354 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:319 
the fluidity of the debate, however, it is helpful to examine such an 
approach as another possible solution to the legal issue raised by 
Homes of Hope. 
First, the potential solution is likely to be politically unpopular.  
The fact that this proposed solution is a general ban on accepting 
more than a municipality’s fair share raises doubts as to whether the 
drafters hold the same concern elucidated by this Comment—the ef-
ficient use of land and the sparing use of variances.  Second, the sen-
ators’ solution is too broad.  No valid reason explains why an appli-
cant for a variance to build affordable housing could not go through 
the non-inherently beneficial use route.  This is the same path all 
other applicants for variances must take, and concluding that because 
a municipality has complied with the FHA it should never have to 
even consider accepting more affordable housing through a use va-
riance is unnecessary and unreasonable.  Where a parcel of land can 
be used for a purpose not permitted by the zoning, it should receive a 
variance if the legal requirements for obtaining a variance are met. 
A more sensible compromise is possible.  Where a municipality 
has complied with its FHA requirement, affordable housing should 
be deemed a non-inherently beneficial use in that municipality.  The 
judiciary, rather than the legislature, is the appropriate branch to 
handle such a declaration because the judiciary created the doctrine 
of inherently beneficial use in the first place.  The judiciary is more 
capable of making a narrow, case-by-case decision that thereby re-
flects the individuality of the variance process.  The judiciary’s failure 
to refine the doctrine could lead to the adoption of the proposed leg-
islation, which is unnecessary and creates bad policy.  Removing af-
fordable housing from inherently beneficial use status in a FHA-
compliant municipality makes sense because a need for affordable 
housing within that municipality is no longer demonstrated.  Further, 
allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use 
in municipalities that have not complied with their FHA requirement 
provides another tool to incentivize compliance with the FHA. 
Such a decision would harmonize the MLUL and the FHA.  The 
FHA would remain the primary legislation equipped to handle the 
affordable housing shortage in New Jersey.
263
  Variance practices re-
 
 263 At the time of the writing of this Comment, State Senator Raymond Lesniak 
introduced legislation that would abolish the Council on Affordable Housing and 
vest the powers and duties that are not repealed by the legislation with the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs.  S. 1, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/1_R1a.PDF; Peggy Ackermann and 
Claire Heininger, New Jersey Senate Passes Affordable Housing Overhaul, NJ.COM (Jun. 11, 
2010), http://www.nj.com/sunbeam/index.ssf?/base/news-6/1276238420285890 
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.xml&coll=9.  Questions about the bill’s ultimate constitutionality exist.  See Elizabeth 
Downey, Opinion Letter, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., N.J. STATE LEGISLATURE (Apr. 
13, 2010), available at FairShareHousing.Org (search “Office of Legislative Services”; 
then follow “OSL; Lesniak Housing Bill Dead On Arrival” hyperlink at top of the 
page; then click on “Read OLS analysis here” hyperlink at bottom of the page) (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2010).  The Office of Legislative Services concluded that while the 
Legislature has the authority to abolish the Council on Affordable Housing, provi-
sions allowing for the satisfaction of affordable housing needs through inclusionary 
zoning techniques alone “may be susceptible to a constitutional challenge on the ba-
sis that relying solely on inclusionary zoning ordinances may violate the constitution-
al requirement that the exercise of a municipality’s land use regulations promotes 
the general welfare.”  Id. at 1.  Affordable-housing advocates argue implementing S-
1would only worsen New Jersey’s affordable housing problem.  See Kevin D. Walsh, 
Affordable Housing: Bill Eliminating COAH Would Only Make Matters Worse, 
DAILYRECORD.COM (Jul. 25, 2010), available at 
http://fairsharehousing.org/pdf/072510_-_Affordable_Housing_Bill_eliminating_ 
COAH_would_only_make_matters_worse.pdf; see also Kevin D. Walsh, New Jersey Law 
Journal Editorial on S-1, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER BLOG (Jun. 18, 2010), 
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/new-jersey-law-journal-editorial-on-s-1/ (cri-
ticizing S-1 for doing away with state-imposed calculations of affordable housing 
needs in favor of allowing municipalities to certify their own compliance after meet-
ing certain minimal requirements).   
The Assembly on December 13, 2010, passed its version of S1, known as A3447.  
Assemb. 3447, 214th Leg. Reg. Sess. (NJ 2010).   Because the focus of this Comment 
is the role a use variance plays in land use and development, it will not provide any 
commentary on the ultimate effectiveness of either S1 or A3447 in creating afforda-
ble housing.  Most germane to this Comment is that both versions of the bill serve to 
further the argument advanced herein.  The bill explicitly states that a variance for 
affordable housing in a municipality deemed “inclusionary” should not be reviewed 
under the inherently beneficial use standard.  Id. at 6.  The provision of the bill al-
lowing a zoning board of adjustment, or other land use board, to review a use va-
riance to build affordable housing as a non-inherently beneficial use will give effect 
to the admonition that variances should be used sparingly. See supra Part III.A.  Such 
a provision will eliminate another factual scenario akin to that confronted in Eas-
tampton from occurring.   
At this point it remains uncertain whether Governor Christie will sign the bill in-
to law.  Governor Christie supported S1.  See Tom Hester Sr., Christie Wants N.J Af-
fordable Housing Bill Approved by the End of June, NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM (Jun. 17, 2010), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/christie-wants-nj-affordable-housing-bill-
approved-by-end-of-june.  NJ.com, however, has reported that Governor Christie is 
not likely to sign the Assembly’s version of the bill because it does not go far enough 
to alleviate the perceived burdens on municipalities in complying with their afforda-
ble-housing requirements.  See Matt Friedman, N.J. Assembly Approves Bill Abolishing 
Council on Affordable Housing, NJ.COM (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news 
/index.ssf/2010/12/nj_assembly_approves_bill_abol.html (citing a spokesman for 
Gov. Christie explaining Christie’s opposition to the version of the bill passed by the 
Assembly); see also David Levinsky, Christie Likely to Veto Housing Bill, PHILLYBURBS.COM 
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.phillyburbs.com/news/news_details/article/26/2010 
/december/14/christie-likely-to-veto-housing-bill.html.  The article quotes Assem-
blyman Jon Brammick, a Republican representing Union, as stating “Quotas cannot 
be in this legislation.  I am convinced that the governor will not sign quotas, and I’m 
convinced it’s not in the best interest of the state.”  See Friedman, supra.   
Adam Gordon, of the Fair Share Housing Center, argues, however, that the As-
sembly bill makes “municipal obligations much lower than any prior numbers issued 
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garding affordable housing would return to their intended purpose 
and provide specific relief from zoning ordinances to use a piece of 
land because it is well-suited for that use.  Variance practice would al-
so cease to be more protective of affordable housing than the legisla-
tion designed to handle the statewide shortfall.
264
  Homes of Hope, 
Inc. argued that removing inherently beneficial use status from af-
fordable housing would essentially create a slippery slope by allowing 
a municipality to refuse variance applications for schools, churches, 
and hospitals.
265
  But if a municipality does not need another school, 
should a variance application be granted merely because another 
municipality determined a school would be inherently beneficial in 
its borders? 
Too much of a good thing can be unnecessary and lead to inef-
ficient uses of land.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, when ex-
plaining why cell phone towers were not inherently beneficial, noted 
that “inherently beneficial uses are generally limited in number with-
in a single municipality.”
266
  This led William Cox, an expert in New 
Jersey land use, to conclude that “where the need that the proposed 
use meets is already satisfied, it may no longer be necessary to consid-
er the use inherently beneficial.”
267
  While the construction of afford-
 
by COAH.”  Adam Gordon, Need for Housing Greater than Ever, but Under Assembly Bill, 
Municipal Obligations Go Down, FAIRSHAREHOUSINGCENTER BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/need-for-housing-greater-than-ever-but-
under-assembly-housing-bill-municipa/.  The Fair Share Housing Center says the As-
sembly’s estimates of the amount of housing created under the new bill are over-
stated.   Id.  It finds that creation is likely to be between 30,000-to-35,000 units over 
the next decade, which it compares to the 52,747 units required under the rules 
struck down by the appellate division in 2007.  Id.  According to the Fair Share Hous-
ing Center, the number of affordable housing units generated under the Assembly’s 
bill is too low.  Kevin Walsh, Assembly Housing Bill an Improvement, but Obligations too 
Low, FAIRSHAREHOUSINGCENTER BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010) http://fairsharehousing.org 
/blog/entry/assembly-housing-bill-an-improvement-but-obligations-too-low/.   
With the future and the effectiveness of the Assembly bill unclear, this Comment 
continues to urge that any solution to the housing conundrum in N.J, should not be 
solved by over-extending the role of a use variance in planning and developing.  To 
the extent that this Comment’s arguments were premised on the notion of COAH 
certification, this Comment and its discussion of Eastampton can be read as a cautio-
nary tale for future regulatory schemes that attempt to remedy the affordable hous-
ing dilemma in New Jersey.  The tale is simple and steeped in the theory underpin-
ning a use variance: that it should be used sparingly.  See supra Part III.A.  It should 
not be used as a substitute for a state-wide solution to the affordability of housing in 
N.J.  
 264 See supra Part II.C. 
 265 See Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note 82, at 18.  
 266 Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 
A.2d 1271, 1281 (N.J. 1998). 
 267 COX, supra note 23, at 188.  
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able housing has laudable origins, building anything simply because a 
builder can do so is a wholly inefficient use of resources and subverts 
cohesive planning. 
Eastampton and other FHA-compliant municipalities have ap-
propriately planned for and included within their boundaries the re-
gional need for affordable housing; therefore, no need can currently 
be demonstrated within those municipalities for affordable housing 
(unless one is prepared to say the entire COAH process is wholly de-
ficient and a need exists as a result of the Council’s deficiency, as un-
doubtedly some might argue).  As a result, affordable housing should 
be deemed a non-inherently beneficial use in those municipalities.  
Returning affordable housing to non-inherently beneficial use status 
in FHA-compliant municipalities will lead to better planning, will not 
duplicate the efforts of the Council, and will harmonize the notion of 
why a variance is used and the deferential standard applied in va-
riance cases by the judiciary. 
In summary, in municipalities that are fully compliant with the 
FHA, affordable housing should not be an inherently beneficial use 
for the purposes of obtaining a use variance.  To obtain a use va-
riance for affordable housing in a FHA-compliant municipality, an 
applicant should have to show site suitability when satisfying the posi-
tive criteria and be subject to the enhanced quality of proof for the 
negative criteria.  State policy favors development through zoning as 
opposed to spot development.
268
  If a municipality has complied with 
FHA, it has appropriately and satisfactorily planned for affordable 
housing in its zoning ordinances and has fulfilled its portion of the 
region’s affordable housing need.  Therefore, no need exists within 
the municipality that can be used to claim that the inherently benefi-
cial use status will help satisfy an affordable housing shortage.  Given 
the legislative preference for development through zoning, use va-
riances should be used sparingly.
269
  The reasons to grant a use va-
riance should be substantial and should be grounded in the theory 
that the parcel of land is suitable for the proposed use.  Further, us-
ing the non-inherently beneficial use status for an application for a 
use variance to build affordable housing will preserve the traditional 
deference to planning boards in evaluating variance applications 
based on their unique understanding of the local circumstances.
270
  In 
contrast, a rule establishing affordable housing as a universal inhe-
rently beneficial use undermines that deference.  Therefore, afforda-
 
 268 See supra Part III.A. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id.  
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ble housing should be treated as a non-inherently beneficial use in 
municipalities that have fully satisfied their FHA requirements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to end exclusionary zoning practices in New Jer-
sey, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared every municipality has a 
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing within its 
boundaries.
271
  The New Jersey State Legislature responded by passing 
the FHA, which created the Council on Affordable Housing.
272
  The 
Council is tasked with determining a municipality’s fair share of the 
state-wide need for affordable housing.
273
  Five years prior to deciding 
Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that afforda-
ble housing constituted a special reason for the grant of a use va-
riance under the MLUL.
274
  Since then, affordable housing has been 
deemed an inherently beneficial use by zoning boards and courts 
across the State.
275
  The designation as an inherently beneficial use al-
lows an applicant for a use variance to satisfy the positive criteria for a 
use variance without requiring the applicant to show the land on 
which the use will be placed is particularly well suited for that use.
276
 
In August of 2009, the appellate division decided Homes of Hope, 
which found that despite a municipality’s full compliance with the 
FHA and satisfaction of its affordable housing obligation, an applica-
tion for a use variance to build affordable housing must still be ana-
lyzed under the inherently beneficial use analysis.
277
  This decision in-
spired a large amount of exaggerated criticism.
278
  There are, 
however, principled policy reasons for opposing the decision in 
Homes of Hope. 
Chief among these reasons is the imperative to show a need for 
an inherently beneficial use.
279
  In Homes of Hope, the appellate divi-
sion and Homes of Hope, Inc. referenced the need projected by the 
 
 271 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 272 See supra Part II.C. 
 273 Id.  
 274 See DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 267 A.2d 31, 38–39 
(N.J. 1970). 
 275 See supra Part IV.A. 
 276 See supra Part III.B. 
 277 See supra Part IV.B. 
 278 See supra Part IV.C. 
 279 See COX, supra note 23, at 185–88 (discussing inherently beneficial uses and 
summarizing various cases dealing with inherently beneficial uses). 
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Council.
280
  Referencing this need, however, ignored the fact that Eas-
tampton had already satisfied its portion of that need and duplicated 
the efforts of the Council.  It therefore left Eastampton without a 
need to justify the preferential treatment in the use variance applica-
tion. 
Further, a zoning board is recognized as being particularly well-
suited to make decisions regarding the needs of its community, and 
hence, the judiciary generally treats a denial of a variance with great 
deference.
281
  To give life to this admonition, a zoning board in a fully 
compliant FHA municipality should be entitled to review an applica-
tion for a use variance under the non-inherently beneficial use analy-
sis rather than under the inherently beneficial use analysis.  Allowing 
zoning boards to review a use variance application to build affordable 
housing in a fully FHA-compliant municipality under the non-
inherently beneficial use analysis will lead to more efficient land use 
decisions.  Under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis, the ap-
plicant will have to show the land in question is particularly well-
suited to the proposed use.
282
  This will also restore a variance, in 
these compliant municipalities, to its intended purpose, which is spe-
cific relief from zoning restrictions in exceptional circumstances.  A 
per se rule that affordable housing constitutes an inherently benefi-
cial use in every municipality, merely because it has in the past, vi-
olates the fact-intensive inquiry a use variance requires and ignores 
the realities of differing conditions in municipalities across the State; 
therefore, affordable housing, in a fully FHA-compliant municipality, 
should be considered a non-inherently beneficial use in terms of a 
use variance application. 
 
 280 Homes of Hope, Inc., v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128, 
1134 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).  
 281 See supra Part III.A. 
 282 See supra Part III.B. 
